We extend the consistency principle for strategic games ) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy pro¯les lack. Our¯ndings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.
Introduction
A series of recent papers characterize solutions for strategic games using the axiom of "consistency", and some complementary axioms. This literature focuses on point-valued solutions which assign to each game a collection of strategy pro¯les. In this paper we extend these ideas to apply to set-valued solutions which assign a collection of product sets of strategies to each game. Our¯ndings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory. The motivation of our study is as follows:
According to the classical view, game theory is a normative science with the aim to o®er "self-enforcing recommendations" to rational players (see e.g. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, footnote 3) or van Damme (1987, pp 1-3) ). Most game theoretic solutions are point-valued. If the solution is a good one, each pro¯le selected should have the property that, once recommended to the players, none of them should have an incentive to deviate.
However, there are several reasons why one might prefer to study setvalued solutions, where each player is recommended a set of strategies. First, as argued by Basu and Weibull (1991) , there is no obvious reason why recommendations should take the form of a single strategy rather than a set of strategies. Second, if one does not consider mixed strategies as reasonable objects of choice (see e.g. Ariel Rubinstein's arguments in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) , Section 3.2.1) then in many games no equilibria exist while appropriate set-valued solutions might have no such problems. Third, some notions that arise in decision-theoretic approaches to analyzing games, like the product set of rationalizable strategies (Bernheim (1984) , Pearce (1984) ),¯t quite nicely into the framework of set-valued solutions. Fourth, in many games some player will have no "strict" incentive to comply with a recommended pro¯le because he has multiple optimal choices given that all others comply. If all such strategies are made part of the recommendation, this will come as a strategy set. Similar concerns presumably motivate Nash's (1951) notion of "strict solvability", and certainly motivate the work of Basu and Weibull (1991) and Hurkens (1995, see especially pp 13-14) . introduce the axiom of "consistency" for pointvalued solutions and show that it is a useful axiom for characterizing and understanding these solutions.
6 Intuitively, a solution is consistent if any pro¯le selected by this solution is also selected in any "reduced game", in which only a subset of the players is active as before while the remaining players make choices in accordance with the pro¯le under consideration and then "leave the game". Given the classical view of game theory, consistency has a natural interpretation: If a subset of players commit to following an initially self-enforcing recommendation, then the recommendation is still self-enforcing for the remaining players. Arguably, this is a "desirable" feature of a recommendation.
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We note that in the early days of game theory set-valued solutions were in focus. In a two-person zero-sum game, the set of strategy pro¯les, in which each player uses a maxminimizer strategy, has a product structure, and this observation is central to von Neumann's (1928) claim that he can solve zero-sum games. Nash's (1951) various notions of solutions of (solvable) games are product sets of strategies (he never promotes equilibrium points as solutions!). In contemporary game theory set-valued solutions are in focus in Basu and Weibull (1991) , Hurkens (1995 Hurkens ( ,1996 , and also in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) . However, the "stable sets" of Kohlberg and Mertens need not have a product structure, and so¯t less conveniently into the recommendation setting we have described.
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Confer also Aumann (1987, p 479) who anticipates these results and Salonen (1992) who conducts an analysis of the Nash equilibrium concept using an axiom closely related to consistency.
A recent literature has emerged in which the consistency axiom is in focus.
7 This literature focuses exclusively on point-valued solutions. We show that the consistency principle and the notion of a reduced game can be readily extended to set-valued solutions. However, a "leaving player" of a reduced game is not necessarily restricted to make one particular choice, so such a game has as many players as its parent game. This is in contrast to the set-up of , where reductions always decrease the number of players. In order to allow for a comparison of results it is necessary to somewhat modify the traditional theory. A game, reduced with respect to some particular pro¯le, is viewed as a game with the same number of players as the original game, but with a subset of players restricted to choose from singleton strategy sets containing only the strategy prescribed by the pro¯le.
A central axiom, complementary to consistency, in is that of "one-person rationality", which imposes a rationality requirement on decision making in games with only one player. This axiom has cutting power in the theory of Peleg and Tijs because reduced games have fewer players than parent games. With our new view of reductions this axiom no longer works however. We replace it by another axiom, "rationality", which imposes a rationality requirement on decision making in any game. Then, the essence of the analysis of can be recaptured in the new framework we propose.
We then turn to set-valued solutions, focusing on the class of¯nite games. We generalize several axioms used in the traditional approach, present a few set-valued solutions, and investigate whether these satisfy the new axioms. We ask what set-valued solutions satisfy those axioms that generalize the axioms that can characterize the Nash equilibrium concept in the traditional approach. The answer is somewhat surprising: The collection of singleton sets, each involving a Nash equilibrium, is not uniquely implied. Other solutions too qualify, for example the collection of product strategy sets with the "best response property" in the sense of Pearce (1984) , which turns out to be the largest solution satisfying consistency and rationality. We henceforth refer to this solution as BRP. This solution has the virtue of being non-empty for the class of¯nite games, something "the Nash singletons" solution does not achieve.
For the traditional approach, Norde, Potters, Reijnierse, and Vermeulen (1996) have shown that if one insists that a solution selects a non-empty collection of pro¯les for each game that possesses a Nash equilibrium, then one cannot move towards re¯nements of Nash equilibria without producing inconsistent solutions. As consistency is often viewed as a desirable property (see our remark above and also Aumann (1987, p 478-9) for a general appraisal), this result has been taken as a set-back for the theories of equilibrium re¯nements and equilibrium selection. For example, Eric van Damme and Robert Aumann express some concern in the interview Aumann (1996, pp 28-30) and GÄ uth (1998) attempts to "avoid the impasse" by weakening consistency. We argue that, given that consistency is viewed as a desirable condition, the¯ndings reported in the previous paragraph suggest a way out of this dilemma. Instead of re¯ning the point-valued Nash equilibrium solution, one should focus on the set-valued solution BRP and try to re¯ne that solution while retaining consistency and other properties deemed desirable.
In order to exemplify this line of research we use Basu and Weibull's (1991) notion of a set "closed under rational behavior" to isolate re¯ne-ments of BRP which are set-valued analogues of the strict equilibrium solution (Harsanyi (1973) ), and prove that the desirable properties satis¯ed by BRP still hold. As these re¯nements concern product sets of strategies rather than strategy pro¯les, they look quite di®erent from standard re¯ne-ments. They need not always imply Nash behavior, but in some cases they have considerably more cutting power than standard re¯nements. We illustrate this using an example due to Hurkens (1996) .
Notation. Throughout this paper strict inclusion is denoted by ½ and weak inclusion by µ.
Point-valued solutions
The main aim of this section is to modify the axiom of "consistency" for point-valued solutions, introduced by , such that it may be viewed as a special case of the consistency principle for set-valued solutions, which will be de¯ned in Section 3. Moreover we will rephrase some of the traditional results in this new setting.
Throughout this paper we focus on¯nite strategic games. Such a game is a tuple G =< N; A; u >, where N is the¯nite player set, A = ¦ i2N A i is the product set of the¯nite strategy sets A i (i 2 N), and u = (u i ) i2N is the vector of payo® functions u i : A ! IR (i 2 N). If jA i j = 1 then i is called a dummy player of the game G. Let ¡ be the collection of all¯nite strategic games. A point-valued solution on ¡ is a map Á which assigns to every game G =< N; A; u >2 ¡ a collection of strategy pro¯les in A. An example of a point-valued solution is the solution NE which assigns to every game G 2 ¡ the set of Nash equilibria of G:
The central axiom in the traditional approach to characterization of pointvalued solutions is that of consistency. The version of this axiom we use is based on the following notion of a reduced game. For a¯nite game G =< N; A; u >, for a coalition S ½ N , and for a strategy pro¯le a = (a i ) i2N 2 A the reduced game of G with respect to S and a is the game
Note that the reduced game G S;fag belongs to ¡. G S;fag has as many players as the game G, because the players in NnS are still present as dummy players, whereas in the traditional de¯nition of the notion of reduced game these players leave the game. It is allowed that S = ;, in which case the game G S;fag has only dummy players.
A second common axiom in the characterizations in the traditional literature deals with optimization in one-person games. In and Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) the axiom of one-person-rationality (OPR) is used, requiring the selection of all maximizers in one-person games, whereas in Norde et al. (1996) the weaker axiom of utility maximization (UM) is used, which requires the selection of a subset of the set of all maximizers in one-person games. The axioms (OPR) and (UM) work well in these cases, because reduction of games involves a reduction of the number of players. However, in our present de¯nition of the notion of reduced game, the number of players is not reduced and (OPR) or (UM) can not be used. As a substitute we propose the axiom of rationality. In the de¯nition of this axiom below the set ¢(¦ j2Nnfig A j ) is the collection of probability distributions (beliefs) over ¦ j2Nnfig A j and we write u i (a i ; ¹ ¡i ) for the expected utility for player i if he plays strategy a i and the other players play a strategy pro¯le according to the probability distribution ¹ ¡i 2 ¢(¦ j2Nnfig A j ).
De¯nition 2.2 A point-valued solution Á on ¡ satis¯es rationality (RAT) if for every G =< N; A; u >2 ¡, for every b = (b i ) i2N 2 Á(G) and for every i 2 N there exists an
The following proposition shows that point-valued solutions satisfying (CONS) and (RAT) are re¯nements of the Nash equilibrium concept (cf. Proposition 2.8 in ).
Proposition 2.1 Let Á be a point-valued solution on ¡ satisfying (CONS) and (RAT). Then Á(G) µ NE(G) for every G 2 ¡.
) and by (RAT) we get that a i is a best response to (a j ) j6 =i . Hence a 2 NE(G).
Proposition 2.1 is still true if we replace the axiom of rationality by a weaker axiom, which requires that if a pro¯le is selected in some game with one nondummy player, then that player must choose a utility maximizing strategy.
The following axioms are important in the traditional approach:
ii) restricted non-emptiness (r-NEM) if for every G 2 ¡ with NE(G) 6 = ; we have Á(G) 6 = ;.
In Norde et al. (1996) the Nash equilibrium concept on the class of mixed extensions of all¯nite games is characterized by utility maximization, consistency, and non-emptiness. For¯nite games this characterization was already given in Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) . Since the Nash equilibrium set may be empty in these games the axiom of non-emptiness had to be replaced by restricted non-emptiness. Both proofs in Norde et al. (1996) and Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) use a construction which associates with every game G and every Nash equilibrium x of G an ancestor game H with a unique Nash equilibrium y such that G may be viewed as a reduced game of H. Since a point-valued solution, satisfying utility maximization, consistency, and (restricted) non-emptiness should select y in H, one infers, by consistency, that it allows x in G. In our present setting this argument breaks down because the ancestor game H has more players than G and reduced games do not have fewer players. However, we can overcome this problem by adding the dummy out property.
De¯nition 2.4 A point-valued solution Á on ¡ satis¯es the dummy out property (DOP) if for every G =< N; A; u > and for every i 2 N with jA i j = 1 and
). Here the payo® functionsũ j (j 2 Nnfig) are de¯ned byũ j (a ¡i ) = u j (a ¡i ; a i ) where a i is the unique element of A i . Proof One easily veri¯es that NE satis¯es (CONS), (RAT), (DOP), and (r-NEM). In order to prove the only-if-part, suppose that Á satis¯es (CONS), (RAT), (DOP), and (r-NEM). We have to show that Á(G) = NE(G) for every G 2 ¡. By Proposition 2.1 we get that Á(G) µ NE(G) for every G 2 ¡. For the proof of the converse inclusion, let G =< N; A; u >2 ¡ and x 2 NE(G). The ancestor game H =< N 0 ; B; v >2 ¡ is constructed in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3 in Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) , i.e N 0 = N [ f0g, B i = A i for every i 2 N , B 0 = f®;¯g, and the payo® function for player i 2 N is de¯ned by
for every a 2 A and the payo® function for player 0 is de¯ned by
for every a 2 A. One easily veri¯es that (®; x) is the unique Nash equilibrium of H. Since Á(H) µ NE(H) we infer by (r-NEM) that (®; x) 2 Á(H).
). Since player 0 is a dummy player in H N;f(®;x)g we get, by (DOP), x 2 Á(G), which¯nishes the proof.
In the Nash equilibrium concept is characterized by one-person rationality, consistency, and converse consistency. This result could be "duplicated" in the style of Proposition 2.2 by adjusting the de¯-nition of (RAT) (such that it selects all maximizers in games with at most one non-dummy player) and by giving a de¯nition of converse consistency, which takes into account the new notion of a reduced game. However, we will not focus on converse consistency in this paper.
Set-valued solutions
We now turn our attention to set-valued solutions and generalize the axioms, mentioned in Section 2, such that they apply to set-valued solutions. We then present some examples and results.
A set-valued solution on ¡ is a map Ã which assigns to every game G =< N; A; u >2 ¡ a collection Ã(G) of product sets, which are nonempty subsets of A. With every point-valued solution Á we can associate the set-valued solutionÁ which assigns to every G 2 ¡ the collectionÁ(G) = ffxg : x 2 Á(G)g. In this way the set-valued solutions can be viewed as a generalization of the point-valued solutions.
In order to give the de¯nition of the consistency axiom for set-valued solutions, we¯rst have to de¯ne the notion of a reduced game with respect to some product set and some coalition.
For a G =< N; A; u >2 ¡, for a coalition S ½ N , and for a product set B = ¦ i2N B i µ A; B 6 = ; the reduced game of G with respect to S and B is the game G S;B =< N; ¦ i2S A i £ ¦ i2NnS B i ;ũ >, whereũ = (ũ i ) i2N is the vector of restrictions of the payo® functions u i (i 2 N ) to ¦ i2S A i £¦ i2N nS B i . Note that this game belongs to ¡, that it has jNj players, regardless of whether any B i is a singleton or not, and that, if B is a singleton set, this de¯nition coincides with the de¯nition of a reduced game in Section 2.
The de¯nitions of consistency, rationality, non-emptiness, restricted nonemptiness, and the dummy out property for set-valued solutions are straightforward.
(ii) rationality (RAT) if for every G =< N; A; u >2 ¡, B 2 Ã(G), i 2 N , and
(iii) non-emptiness (NEM) if for every G 2 ¡ we have Ã(G) 6 = ;;
(iv) restricted non-emptiness (r-NEM) if for every G 2 ¡ with NE(G) 6 = ; we have Ã(G) 6 = ;;
(v) the dummy out property (DOP) if for every G =< N; A; u >2 ¡ and for every i 2 N with jA i j = 1 and
). Here, again, the payo® functions u j (j 2 Nnfig) are de¯ned byũ j (a ¡i ) = u j (a ¡i ; a i ) where a i is the unique element of A i .
We now give several examples of set-valued solutions. The two¯rst ones are included for illustrative purposes and the others turn out to be important for the results in this section.
Example 3.1 Examples of set-valued solutions are (i) the solution EMP on ¡ which assigns to every G 2 ¡ the empty collection;
(ii) the solution ALL on ¡ which assigns to every G =< N; A; u >2 ¡ the collection of all non-empty product sets B µ A;
(iii) the solutionNE on ¡, associated with the point-valued solution NE, which assigns to every G 2 ¡ the collection of singleton sets that contain a Nash equilibrium;
(iv) the solution BRP on ¡, which assigns to every G =< N; A; u >2 ¡ the collection of product sets, having the best response property, i.e. the collection of product sets B = ¦ i2N B i such that for every i 2 N and for every b i 2 B i there exists a ¹ ¡i 2 ¢(¦ j2N nfig B j ) with
(v) the solution BRP + on ¡, which assigns to every G 2 ¡ the collection of maximal product sets, having the best response property; (vi) the solution BRP ¡ on ¡, which assigns to every G 2 ¡ the collection of minimal product sets, having the best response property.
The¯rst three examples are self-explanatory. BRP is a coarsening ofNE. If x is a Nash equilibrium of a game G then fxg has the best response property. However, elements of BRP(G) are not required to be singletons, so BRP(G) is a superset ofNE(G) for any game G. BRP + is a re¯nement of BRP. For every G 2 ¡, BRP + (G) consists of all product sets B with the best response property, such that there is no product set B 0 ¾ B having this property. In fact, it follows from the work of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) that this last collection contains only one set, namely the product set of rationalizable strategies, where a strategy a i of player i is rationalizable if there exists a B = ¦ i2N B i with the best response property such that a i 2 B i .
8 For every G 2 ¡, BRP ¡ (G) consists of all product sets B with the best response property, such that there is no product set B 0 ½ B having this property.
In Proposition 2.1 we showed that every point-valued solution, satisfying (CONS) and (RAT), is a re¯nement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the following proposition we show that set-valued solutions, satisfying (CONS) and (RAT), are re¯nements of BRP.
Proposition 3.1 Let Ã be a set-valued solution on ¡ satisfying (CONS) and (RAT). Then Ã(G) µ BRP(G) for every G 2 ¡.
Proof Let G =< N; A; u >2 ¡. If jNj = 1 then Ã(G) µ BRP(G) follows by (RAT). Suppose now that G has at least two players. Let B = ¦ i2N B i 2 Ã(G) and i 2 N . By (CONS) we have B 2 Ã(G fig;B ) and hence, by (RAT), we infer that every b i 2 B i is a best response (of all strategies in A i ) to some belief ¹ ¡i 2 ¢(¦ j2N nfig B j ). So, B 2 BRP(G).
The following proposition shows which solutions in Example 3.1 satisfy (CONS) and (RAT).
Proposition 3.2 The solutions EMP,NE, BRP, and BRP
+ satisfy (CONS) and (RAT).
Proof One easily veri¯es that EMP satis¯es (CONS) and (RAT). In order to prove thatNE and BRP satisfy (CONS) note that a (pure) Nash equilibrium a in a G 2 ¡ remains a Nash equilibrium in the reduced game G S;fag for every S ½ N and every product set B with the best response property has still the best response property in the reduced game G S;B for every S µ N. To prove that also BRP + satis¯es (CONS) let G 2 ¡, S ½ N , and R = ¦ i2N R i be the product set of rationalizable strategies in G. Denote furthermore by R 0 = ¦ i2N R 0 i the product set of rationalizable strategies in G S;R . Since R has the best response property in G, it also has the best response property in G S;R . Therefore R i µ R 0 i for every i 2 N. In fact, by de¯nition of G S;R , R i = R 0 i for every i 2 NnS. Since for every i 2 NnS any r i 2 R 0 i (= R i ) is a best response to some belief ½ ¡i 2 ¢(¦ j2Nnfig R j ) µ ¢(¦ j2Nnfig R 0 j ) and for every i 2 S any r i 2 R 0 i is a best response to some belief ½ ¡i 2 ¢(¦ j2N nfig R 0 j ) the set R 0 has the best response property in G. Therefore R 0 µ R and hence R 0 = R, which proves that R satis¯es (CONS). In order to prove that the solutionsNE; BRP, and BRP + satisfy (RAT) it is su±cient to note that these solutions only select product sets with the best response property.
An example of an inconsistent re¯nement of BRP is the solution BRP ¡ .
Example 3.2 Let G =< N; A; u >2 ¡ be the bimatrix game with N = f1; 2g, A 1 = fa; bg, A 2 = fc; d; eg, and u given by c d e a 1; 2 1; 1 2; 0 b 2; 0 1; 1 1; 2 One easily veri¯es that B = fa; bg £ fdg is a minimal set having the best response property. However, with S = f1g, the reduced game of G with respect to S and B is the bimatrix game with payo® matrix d a 1; 1 b 1; 1 which admits only fag £ fdg and fbg £ fdg as minimal sets having the best response property. Therefore, the solution BRP ¡ on ¡ does not satisfy (CONS).
For some¯nite games G the collectionNE(G) may be empty. Thereforê NE satis¯es (r-NEM) but not (NEM). However, BRP ¡ ; BRP, and BRP + all satisfy (NEM). In order to see this note that the mixed extension of any¯nite strategic game G =< N; A; u > possesses a Nash equilibrium Nash (1951) ). Now let, for every i 2 N , B i µ A i be the support of x i . Then the product set B = ¦ i2N B i has the best response property. So every¯nite strategic game G admits a product set with the best response property and, a fortiori, a minimal set with the best response property. Since (NEM) is a stronger axiom than (r-NEM) we infer that the solutions BRP ¡ ; BRP, and BRP + also satisfy (r-NEM). One easily veri¯es that all solutions in Example 3.1 satisfy (DOP).
If we consider the solutions mentioned in Example 3.1 on ¡ then the following table summarizes the statements made above:
In the case of point-valued solutions the Nash equilibrium concept NE is completely characterized on ¡ by consistency, rationality, restricted nonemptiness, and dummy out property (Proposition 2.2). The table above shows that this is not the case for set-valued solutions. These axioms are not only satis¯ed byNE but also by BRP and BRP + . Moreover, as seen above, the two latter solutions even have the virtue of being non-empty for every¯nite game.
Re¯ning BRP
In this section we accept as a working hypothesis that the consistency criterion is "desirable". Then, as argued in the Introduction, the result that there is no proper re¯nement of the Nash equilibrium concept satisfying consistency, rationality, and non-emptiness is troubling for the theory of equilibrium re¯nements. In Section 3 it was shown that several set-valued solutions satisfy these properties, and the Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 together imply that BRP is the unique maximal such solution. In light of this result we suggest a new approach for normative game theory: Shift attention from the point-valued solution NE to the set-valued solution BRP and re¯ne the latter while preserving consistency and other properties deemed desirable! In this section we suggest one way of following this line of research.
Say a product set of strategies is recommended to the players. One might argue that this recommendation is not really self-enforcing unless for every player i and every belief consistent with the other players con¯rming with the recommendation, no strategy outside i's recommended set is optimal for him to use. Basu and Weibull (1991) , Hurkens (1995, pp 13-14) , and also Nash (1951, pp 290-291) discuss related ideas. Here we make use of Basu and Weibull's (1991) notion of a set closed under rational behavior -a curb set. The de¯nition of a curb set, as well as of two¯ner notions that turn out to be useful, are as follows:
De¯nition 4.1 Let G =< N; A; u >2 ¡. A non-empty product set B = ¦ i2N B i µ A is called (i) curb if for every i 2 N and a i 2 A i , which is a best response to some belief ¹ ¡i 2 ¢(¦ j2Nnfig B j ), we have a i 2 B i ;
(ii) tight curb if B is curb and has the best response property;
(iii) minimal curb if B is curb and there is no product set B 0 ½ B which is curb. Basu and Weibull (1991) show that every¯nite game admits at least one minimal curb set and that the minimal curb sets and the minimal tight curb sets coincide. Therefore every¯nite game also possesses at least one tight curb set. Since we are interested in re¯nements of BRP we will investigate whether the two set-valued solutions, which select the tight curb and minimal curb sets respectively, satisfy consistency and other properties. We hence de¯ne the following solutions on ¡: t-CURB(G) = fB µ A : B is tight curbg; min-CURB(G) = fB µ A : B is minimal curbg for every G =< N; A; u >2 ¡. Every tight curb set or every minimal curb set which is singleton contains a strict equilibrium. Therefore t-CURB and min-CURB may be viewed as set-valued analogues of the point-valued solution assigning to every game the collection of strict equilibria. Of course there are¯nite games without strict equilibria. The following proposition shows that the solutions t-CURB and min-CURB satisfy (NEM) as well as (CONS), (RAT), and (DOP).
Proposition 4.1 The solutions t-CURB and min-CURB satisfy (CONS), (RAT), (NEM), and (DOP).
Proof In order to prove that t-CURB satis¯es (CONS) let G =< N; A; u >2 ¡, B = ¦ i2N B i a tight curb set in G and S ½ N. Since BRP satis¯es (CONS) and B has the best response property in G it also has the best response property in G S;B . Since by changing from G to G S;B no best responses to beliefs in B are deleted B is also curb in G S;B . Hence B is a tight curb set in G S;B which proves that t-CURB satis¯es (CONS). For the proof of the consistency of min-CURB assume that B = ¦ i2N B i is a minimal curb set in G =< N; A; u > and S ½ N. Suppose there is B 0 ½ B which is a curb set in G S;B . One easily veri¯es in that case that B 0 is a curb set in G, which contradicts the minimality of B. Hence B is also a minimal curb set in G S;B which proves the consistency of min-CURB.
Since the solutions t-CURB and min-CURB only select sets with the best response property both solutions satisfy (RAT).
In Proposition 1 of Basu and Weibull (1991) the authors show that everȳ nite game admits at least one minimal curb set and in Proposition 2 they show that the minimal curb sets and the minimal tight curb sets coincide. As a consequence we get that both solutions t-CURB and min-CURB satisfy (NEM).
One easily veri¯es that the solutions t-CURB and min-CURB satisfy (DOP).
Proposition 4.1 illustrates that the research program we have proposed is feasible. We believe the program promises to deliver solutions that have cutting power in certain applications. To argue this point, consider the following game which is a special case of a "Burning Money" example discussed by Hurkens (1996, Figure 2 with c = 1):
e f g h a 9; 5 9; 5 0; 4 0; 4 b 4; 4 4; 4 6; 7 6; 7 c 8; 5 ¡1; 4 8; 5 ¡1; 4 d 3; 4 5; 7 3; 4 5; 7
In this game fag £ fe; fg is the unique minimal curb set (see Hurkens (1996, p 188 ) for a proof). Note that the strategies c and g are not involved, despite the fact that (c; g) is a proper equilibrium. 9 This is not to say that minimal curb sets always promote sharper predictions than does standard equilibrium concepts. For example, in a "matching pennies" game the entire set of strategy pro¯les is the unique minimal curb set while no equilibrium exists. (If the game's mixed extension is considered the entire set of strategy pro¯les is again the unique minimal curb set, while the game has a unique equilibrium.)
Summary
The axiom of consistency for point-valued solutions of strategic games is introduced in . They show that any consistent pointvalued solution which satis¯es a rationality requirement must be a re¯ne-ment of the Nash equilibrium concept. Norde et al. (1996) show that requiring also the solution to be non-empty in games that do possess equilibria leads to a characterization of the Nash equilibrium concept. Given that the consistency condition is regarded as "desirable", this result may be taken as troublesome for the theory of equilibrium re¯nements.
We argue that set-valued solutions are natural objects of study for the classical theory of games which is concerned with o®ering self-enforcing recommendations to rational players. We extend the axiom of consistency to apply to such solutions. In the new context the aforementioned problems disappear, although the Nash equilibrium concept no longer takes center stage. Any consistent set-valued solution satisfying a rationality requirement must be a re¯nement of BRP, the solution assigning to each game the collection of sets with the best response property.
BRP itself satis¯es these properties and also many re¯nements do so. Based on this¯nding we propose to re¯ne BRP instead of the Nash correspondence, while requiring that consistency and other properties deemed desirable are preserved. To exemplify this line of research, we use Basu and Weibull's (1991) notion of a curb set. This leads for example to the solution min-CURB, the re¯nement of BRP which selects all product sets which are minimal curb. This solution has considerable cutting power in certain games. We show that min-CURB satis¯es consistency, a rationality requirement, and non-emptiness.
